Swedish rape legislation from use of force to voluntariness - critical reflections from an everyday life perspective by Bladini, Moa & Svedberg Andersson, Wanna
95
This is an Open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0/), permitting all use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • Volume 8, Issue 2, 2020, pp. 95-125
Swedish rape legislation from 
use of force to voluntariness 
- critical reflections from an 
everyday life perspective 
MOA BLADINI*, WANNA SVEDERG ANDERSSON**
‘I was raised in a world where girls were taught that they get raped for a reason. Their skirt 
was too short, their smile was too wide, their breath smelled of alcohol. And I was guilty 
of all of those things, so the shame had to be mine. It took me years to realize that only one 
thing could have stopped me from being raped that night, and it wasn’t my skirt, it wasn’t 
my smile, it wasn’t my childish trust. The only thing that could have stopped me from being 
raped that night is the man who raped me had he stopped himself.’1
1. Introduction
Criminal legislation on rape has in Sweden been debated and revised several times in 
the last few decades. In 2018 a new construction of rape was introduced, signifying 
an important shift in the understanding of and responsibility for rape. The two most 
significant changes are the change in the construction of rape, where the decisive 
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criterion of use of force is replaced by a requirement of voluntariness (corresponding 
to lack of consent in public debate) and the new crime of negligent rape.
The overarching aim of this article is to review and critically analyse Swedish statutory 
regulation of rape, including previous discussions. We take our point of departure in 
feminist legal studies, and some of the critique that has been put forward within this 
field.
At the core of criminal legislation on rape we find the aim to protect the individual’s 
right to personal and sexual integrity and sexual self-determination.2 These are the 
fundamental interests to be protected and have been at the centre of the discussions 
on the legal construction of rape for the last fifty years and are also the focus of 
analysis in this article. The debate, in Sweden and elsewhere, has focused mainly on 
two options as possible ways of constructing the rape offence, either with use of force 
or with consent,3 as the decisive criterion.4 To simplify, the continental countries in 
Europe have been stuck to a construction of the rape offence based on use of force for 
longer than Anglo-American countries, which introduced a concept of lack of consent 
earlier.5 The Nordic countries have historically had their rape legislation based on 
use of force.6 In Sweden, feminist activism, political debate and critical legal research 
finally led to extensive changes in legislation on sexual offences which entered into 
2 Prop. (2017/18:177) En ny sexualbrottslagstiftning byggd på frivillighet, p. 21. 
3 We use different concepts in different contexts. Consent has been the wording used in the 
public debate in Sweden as well as in international discourse on rape, and when addressing 
these general discussions, we will therefore use only consent. In comparison, when we discuss 
consent in the specific Swedish context, i.e.  development towards current legislation based on 
voluntariness, we use lack of consent, which was the wording used in the terms of reference of 
previous sexual offences inquiries in 1998 and 2008 (SOU 1998:48, Översyn av lagstiftningen om 
sexualbrott and SOU 2008:94, Utvärdering av 2005 års sexualbrottsreform, m.m.). Voluntariness 
is used in relation to the current legislation as it became the decisive criterion. 
4 MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10(2) Harvard Law & Policy Review (2016) pp. 431-477, McGlynn 
& Munro, Rethinking Rape Law: International and Comparative Perspectives (Routledge 2010) 
and Leijonhufvud, Samtyckesutredningen: Lagskydd för den sexuella integriteten (Thomson 
förlag 2008).
5 In a European context, countries have handled the discussions on and demands for consent-
based legislation differently over the years. England and Wales adopted consent-based rape 
legislation early (in 1976), but it has proved difficult to implement in practice (Munro 2010). 
Scotland resisted the demands for legal change for longer, but changed its legislation about a 
decade ago. In continental Europe, countries such as Italy and Croatia changed their laws in the 
early 2000s, while the shift from use of force to consent in the debate in the Nordic countries 
took place around 2005. See Jokila & Niemi, Rape Law and Coercive Circumstances in Rape in 
the Nordic Countries: Continuity and Change, eds. Heinskou, Skilbrei & Stefansen (Routledge 
2020) pp. 120-136, p. 122. 
6 Jokila & Niemi 2020 pp. 120-136.
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force in July 2018.7 
The new legislation brings an important change by clarifying that a (female) body 
is not available until she says ‘stop’, but unavailable until she says ‘yes’.8 According to 
the preparatory works, legislation based on whether or not participation in a sexual 
activity is voluntary is expected to send a clear normative message that if sex is not 
voluntary, it is illegal. This, in turn, is assumed to influence people’s values  and attitudes 
in the long term and contribute to a view of sexual activity as a relationship that is 
based on reciprocity.9 We hold that the new legislation thereby meets the criticism 
that has long been directed at the previous legislation. However, one important aspect 
of feminist critique of criminal law in general, and regarding sexual violence and 
violence against women in particular, is the problem of the traditional understanding 
of the subject, in line with the liberal conception of the autonomous and rational 
individual.10 We argue that the criterion of voluntariness risks reinforcing this view of 
the subject. Feminist critique of rape legislation has argued that the construction of 
rape is problematic, in the sense that it lacks the ability to take into account structural 
perspectives, i.e. various forms of power imbalances, vulnerabilities and coercive 
circumstances.11   In this article we will discuss the new rape legislation, with these 
7 The non-governmental organisation Fatta has had a great impact and worked closely with 
professor emerita Madeleine Leijonhufvud, one of the most prominent legal scholars on rape 
legislation in Sweden. Andersson, Burman, Svedberg and Wegerstad are also mentioned as 
important legal scholars who have contributed to its development. In the wider context of sexual 
offences, Westerstand, Sutorius and Kaldal have also made important contributions. Although 
the expression #metoo was first used by Tarana Burke in 2006 to highlight, and raise awareness 
of, sexual harassment and assault in society, the #metoo movement began in October 2017, when 
Alyssa Milano asked women across the world to reply to her tweet with the hashtag #metoo. Her 
post followed allegations of a film producer in Hollywood having raped several actresses, and 
was intended to criticise the film industry for suppressing what had happened. In Sweden, the 
movement led to branch calls starting in November 2017, consisting of tens of thousands of 
testimonies.
8 Andersson, Hans (ord) eller hennes (Bokbox förlag 2004). We wish to highlight that this description 
has two normative dimensions, the one that makes women’s bodies unavailable until she says yes 
that we welcome, but another aspect of such a formulation reproduces and consolidates the idea 
of active male sexuality and a female passive sexuality. (Perhaps the wording could be changed 
to – until she invites him.) In this context, is the symbolic value related to a discussion on the 
rape offence, and not in relation to sexual offences in general.  
9 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 22.
10 Andersson, Våld mot kvinnor och straffrätt in På vei: kjønn og rett i Norden, eds. Svensson et 
al. (Makadam förlag 2011), Burman, Rethinking Rape laws in Sweden: coercion, consent or 
non-voluntariness? in Rethinking Rape Law. International and Comparative Perspectives, eds. 
McGlynn & Munro (Routledge 2010) and Berglund, Samtycke eller ej? in Argumentation i 
nordisk straffrätt, eds. Nordlöf (Nordstedts juridik 2013). See also Naffine, Can women be legal 
persons? in Visible women: Essays on feminist legal theory and political philosophy, eds. James & 
Palmer (Hart 2002) pp. 150-173 and Niemi, What we talk about when we talk about buying sex, 
16(2) Violence Against women (2010) pp. 159-172.
11 Andersson 2010 & Jokila & Niemi 2020.
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critical stances as a backdrop. 
The new voluntariness-based construction of the rape offence aims to strengthen 
personal and sexual integrity and sexual self-determination. Some crucial issues 
remain however unaddressed in the preparatory legislative process and need to be 
reflected upon. The first issue is the assumption of what the interests to be protected 
are and the second is how they are best protected. These questions need to be 
scrutinised from an everyday life perspective. We examine whose knowledge and 
whose experiences are used in the legislative process and what it means for those who 
are meant to be protected. 
The article starts with a brief historical overview of the legislative process, from 
1998 until the current rape legislation that will be examined in greater depth. This 
is followed by a discussion of the new criterion of voluntariness through the lens 
of autonomy. The article ends with some concluding comments and reflections on 
future challenges and research questions.12
2. How we got here – from violence and threats, through lack of 
consent towards voluntariness ... and beyond
2.1 Introduction
This section is intended to provide a brief historical overview of the legislative process. 
Below, we will use the word ‘process’ when referring to the development of rape legisla-
tion, i.e. from the use of force (violence and coercion) construction as the decisive crite-
rion of rape, through a discussion of lack of consent, to current rape legislation based on 
voluntariness.13 In this process we wish to highlight the most important changes regard-
ing the definition of rape related to the previous rape legislation based on use of force. 
We start by illustrating the process and the changes to rape legislation with a 
timeline, as this can facilitate an understanding of the legal reforms and their 
chronological sequences regarding changes in the legal definition of rape. Our 
intention is not to present a comprehensive description of all the changes, but to 
focus on certain discussions and changes essential for our discussion later on. 
12 This article can be read as a whole, but those interested only in the historical development of rape 
legislation in Sweden can read chapters 1-3 (chapter 2 gives a historical overview and chapter 
3 deals with the present-day legislation). For those with a particular interest in challenges of 
present-day legislation, discussed from an everyday life perspective, we recommend reading 
chapter 4 in particular. 
13 The focus will be on the period 1998-2018, see Figure 1 below.
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Figure 1. The figure gives a simplified overview of the development of rape legislation, i.e. from 
the use of force (violence and coercion) construction as the decisive criterion of rape, through 
a discussion of lack of consent, that started in 1998, to current rape legislation based on 
voluntariness.
The question of whether the rape legislation should be based on use of force or lack of 
consent has been investigated on three occasions, by the Sexual Offences Committee 
of 1998, the Sexual Offences Committee of 2008, and most recently the Sexual Offences 
Committee of 2014. These reports were followed by legal reforms in 2005, 2013 
and 2018. In the following section 3, we will deal specifically with the current rape 
legislation. To avoid repetitions, as the report of the Sexual Offences Committee of 
2014 forms part of the preparatory work for current legislation, this means that we 
will deal with the latter report in the next section. 
Although the focus is on the process referred to above, we provide a slightly broader 
context and start in the distant past. This is to show how perceptions of interest’s 
worthy of protection by criminalisation have varied over time and to highlight certain 
problematic features associated with previous rape legislation (use of force): problems 
that current rape legislation is intended to counteract. Another reason is that present-
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day application of law sometimes reflects notions of body, sexuality, subject and 
autonomy that can be traced far back in time. In order to understand the legislation 
of today and shape the legislation of tomorrow, it is important to analyse the law in a 
broader context.
In connection with this overview, we also emphasise the importance of certain 
political breakthroughs in gender equality policy which have influenced the general 
perception of what should constitute rape, which in turn has fostered changes in the 
legal definition of rape in recent years. 
Initially, we also wish to underline that neither the legal shift nor other law reforms 
concerning sexual offence legislation have been implemented painlessly. Instead they 
have been the subject of a heated public debate. It is obvious that reforms throughout 
history that have aimed to strengthen the protection of women against violence, 
including sexual violence, for example by extending criminal liability for rape or 
sexual abuse, have been constantly met with criticism and opposition.
2.2 The distant past - what and who to protect? 
The legal definition of rape, as well as the underlying interests that are protected by 
law, has varied over time. Until the introduction of the Penal Act in 1864, rape was 
considered a property crime and not as an attack on the woman − based on a view 
of the woman as the property of either her father or her husband. After 1864, rape 
became a crime of freedom. One purpose was to ensure that the woman was protected 
against violence, but the main reason was to protect the woman’s honour. However, 
the law required the perpetrator to have used heavy and considerable force against 
the victim, who also was expected to have strongly resisted.14   
The current Swedish Criminal Code (SCC), which came into force in 1965, introduced 
rape in the chapter that dealt with Moral Crimes. Rape legislation aimed to ensure 
protection against sexual abuse and protection of the individual’s integrity.15 Before 
the Swedish Criminal Code was introduced, there was a discussion of how much 
violence that was required to force someone to have sex in order for the act to be 
considered as rape. The requirement for violence in the crime of robbery at the time 
was significantly lower − objects and money were thus better protected than a woman’s 
body.16 A bill to reduce the requirement for the degree of violence for rape to the same 
level as robbery was at the time met with strong opposition. Another heated debate 
that created outrage was the proposal to criminalise marital rape. As a result of the 
introduction of the Swedish Criminal Code in 1965, marital rape was criminalised 
14 Leijonhufvud 2015 p. 19, Hassan Jansson, Kvinnofrid: Synen på våldtäkt och konstruktionen av 
kön i Sverige 1600-1800 (Historiska institutionen, Uppsala universitet 2002) p. 51 ff., 162.
15 Leijonhufvud 2015 p. 19.
16 Ibid.
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and considered to be serious sexual abuse by a man of his wife.17 
Leijonhufvud states that the intense opposition to criminalise domestic violence and 
abuse, including rape, should be seen against the background of the classic liberal 
rule of law model, that also divides life into a public sphere and a private sphere.18 
According to this notion, the private sphere was considered to be kept safe from state 
control. Another way of expressing it, is that the individual’s, i.e. the man’s freedom 
in the private sphere was unrestricted – while women’s freedom not to be subjected 
to violence and rape was absent from statutory regulation, i.e. was not regarded as 
important or given priority by the law. The arguments against criminalisation of 
marital rape were mainly based on religious beliefs where sexuality is closely linked 
to reproduction. Additionally, notions of gender and differences between the sexes, 
for example the shortcomings of women and men’s irrepressible sexual drives were 
considered to be obstacles to criminalisation.19 
These views are also closely linked to Rubin’s critique of the essentialist view of sexu-
ality in the Western world, where sex is viewed as something bad until it is legitimised 
by acceptable causes, such as marriage, love or reproduction.20 These ideas derive 
from a view of a woman as either a wife/mother/Madonna (an honourable woman) or 
a whore. Eduards, who discusses body politics, stresses that these notions of different 
kinds of women have in common that female bodies are seen as sexually accessible 
to men, an object of male fantasies and desires.21 This view, where a woman is seen as 
either an honourable woman or a whore, can be discerned in court cases in modern 
times.22 An example is a case from 2011 that concerned a claim for damages. In the 
case, the plaintiff claimed compensation of SEK 7,000 for violation of her personal in-
tegrity and for pain and suffering, both physical and mental.23 The district court con-
cluded that it was undisputed that the defendant (the husband) had given the plaintiff 
(his wife) a slap on the ear, and he was found guilty of minor assault. However, the court 
considered that the compensation for the offence should be reduced (to SEK 5,000) as 
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. p. 23.
19 Ibid. p. 20 ff.
20 Rubin, Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality in The Lesbian and 
Gay Studies, eds. Abelove, Barale & Halperin (Routledge 1993).
21 Eduards, Förbjuden handling – om kvinnors organisering och feministisk teori (Liber 2005) and 
Westerstrand, Mellan mäns händer. Kvinnors rättssubjektivitet internationell rätt och diskurser 
om prostitution och trafficking (Uppsala universitet 2008).
22 Research on rape myths confirms that this is still the case. See for example Temkin, Gray & Barret, 
Different Functions of Rape Myth Use in Court: Findings From a Trial Observation Study, 13(2) 
Feminist Criminology (2018) pp. 205-226, Ellison & Munro, Reacting to Rape. Exploring Mock 
Jurors’ Assessments of Complainant credibility, 49 British Journal of Criminology (2009) pp. 202-
219 and Adolfsson, Blaming Victims of Rape. Studies on Rape Myths and Beliefs About Rape (Dept 
of Psychology, University of Gothenburg 2018). 
23 Svea hovrätt B 4621-10.
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the wife had caused jealousy by having dinner with another man and arriving home 
late, and had made herself unavailable on her phone. The verdict was appealed to the 
Court of Appeal, which instead found the defendant guilty of assault. The act was con-
sidered a serious violation of the plaintiff ’s personal integrity and had taken place in 
her home, where she could expect to feel safe. The Court of Appeal decided that com-
pensation for the offence should be set at SEK 7,000. In addition, the Court of Appeal 
ruled that the district court’s judgment contained elements of value that were clearly 
detrimental to the plaintiff as well as information not relevant to the prosecution. 
This case concerned an offence of assault (SCC 3:5), but is relevant to this discussion 
since it involves a husband’s assault on his wife due to her ‘inappropriate’ behaviour. 
What the district court actually did was to evaluate the woman’s behaviour based on 
underlying norms and notions and then conclude that it is inappropriate behaviour. 
Instead of assessing the perpetrator’s actions as a basis for the claim for damages, the 
focus was on the victim and her behaviour before and during the assault. We argue 
that the district court’s grounds for its judgement can best be understood if it is set 
against the notion of a woman as either an honourable woman or a whore. To put it 
simply, according to this notion her behaviour exceeded the limits of what is expected 
of an honourable wife.24
2.3 In between - 1984 reform and gender equality policy’s impact on rape legisla-
tion
As can be seen from the figure above, in 1984 the sexual offences legislation under-
went thorough reform. The heading of Moral Offences was replaced by the head-
ing Concerning Sexual Offences in the Criminal Code.25  Rape legislation became 
gender-neutral, and women and transgender persons could consequently be both 
rape victims and perpetrators. The legislative changes meant that the prerequisite 
intercourse remained unchanged and referred to intercourse between a man and 
a woman, but that the concept of rape was expanded to also include sexual acts 
that are comparable to intercourse. A special penalty scale was introduced for ag-
gravated rape cases. The prerequisite ‘violent’ (våldförande) was removed, and the 
victim’s actions before the abuse and her relationship to the perpetrator were con-
sidered irrelevant to the criminal classification. The required amount of violence 
and threats was reduced. The threat did not need to entail ‘urgent danger’, and 
threats that appeared dangerous to the threatened person were also included in 
the rape legislation. The main argument in favour of the changes was that the pre-
24 The discussion on how the lawmakers as well as the courts deal with cases differently based on 
the situation at hand, from the dichotomy of whore/Madonna, is at present relevant in order 
to understand/analyse the relationship between the two crimes, rape and the prohibition of 
purchase of sexual services. For a brief discussion, see section 4 below. 
25 Prop. (1983/84:105) New Sexual Offences Legislation.
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vious rape legislation26 was partly based on antiquated views about of women.27 
Contemporary reforms of sexual offences legislation should be seen in the light of the 
progressive gender equality politics. Most important was the acceptance of the genus 
system theory presented by Yvonne Hirdman as a part of an official report.28 Svensson 
points out that the most noteworthy about the theory is:
‘[...] the understanding of sex equality as a complex issue, related to symbols, 
structures and individuals. Further, the theory has affected the way sex/gender 
is conceptualized: as a relationship, instead of a categorisation: the conflict 
between the sexes has become more visible and sex inequality is now seen as 
a matter of unequal power. Men benefit from the sex/gender relationship more 
than women do.’29
This knowledge as the basis for the Swedish Gender Equality Policy was adopted in 
1994 through the Government Bill The Gender Equality Policy: Shared Power and 
Shared Responsibility30 and is still applied today. Regarding how the law can be affected 
in accordance with the theory, Svedberg writes: 
‘According to the theory, the gender system is maintained by two principles. 
Firstly, the sexes are kept apart in all areas of life. Secondly, the male is the 
standard for a human being. At the same time, the male norm permeates every 
aspect of society, that is, from how the world is understood to which power 
relations should be regulated legally.’31 
The unequal power relationship between the sexes is manifested in every area of 
life, from gender-related violence (especially sexual violence) to unjustified pay 
differences. These principles have thus influenced legislation and its application, e.g., 
how rape has historically been defined and the fact that rape within marriage was not 
criminalised until 1965.32
As a part of the Gender Equality Policy the definition of rape was extended at the 
same time through the Government Bill Women’s Peace. The concept of intercourse 
26 By ‘previous rape legislation’ we mean the rape legislation prior to the 1984 reform.
27 Prop. (1983/84:105).
28 SOU (1990:44) Democracy and power in Sweden. Main report of the Inquiry.
29 Svensson, Sex equality: changes in politics, jurisprudence and feminist legal studies in Responsible 
selves: Women in the Nordic legal culture, eds. Gunnarsson, Nousiainen, Lundström & Niemi-
Kiesiläinen (Ashgate 2001) p. 72.
30 Prop. (1993/94:147) Gender Equality Policy: Shared Power and Shared Responsibility.
31 Svedberg 2013 p. 486.
32 In other countries, marital rape was criminalised in Canada in 1983, in the UK in the early 1990s 
(C.R. v. United Kingdom, appl. No 20190/92, 27.6.1994) and in Finland in 1994, see Jokila & 
Niemi 2020 p. 128.
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would also be equated with other sexual activity if the act, with regard to the nature 
of the violation and other circumstances, was comparable to forced intercourse. The 
purpose of this extension of the definition of rape was to emphasise the nature of the 
violation instead of the sexual act.33 Examples of such acts that involve a violation 
comparable to those that occur during forced intercourse are to insert an object or a fist 
into a woman’s vagina or anal opening. The bill states that there must be an objective 
assessment of whether the act typically involves such a serious violation that may occur 
during forced intercourse. In addition, in some cases, omission to report and expose 
certain serious sexual offences would be punishable. However, notwithstanding the 
efforts to improve the protection of the sexual integrity, Leijonhufvud argues that 
this period was not characterised by a unified view of the need to use criminal law to 
combat sexual abuse - even when the victims were children.34
The Government Bill Women’s Peace was adopted in 1998. This reform can be seen as 
being a result of progressive gender equality policy.35 As a result of this bill, the crime 
of gross violation of a woman’s integrity was introduced into the Criminal Code 
and the Act Prohibiting the Purchase of Sexual Services (1998:408) was adopted. 
However, the latter act was repealed in 2005, and the crime was implemented in the 
Criminal Code through Government Bill 2004/05:45. It should be noted that the 
Prostitution inquiry of 1993 was heavily criticised as it proposed that both parties’ 
acts should be criminalised, i.e. both the seller and the buyer.36 This was possible due 
to the inquiry’s choice to use the term ‘sex trade’. According to the inquiry, the term 
‘sex trade’ describes an activity in which at least two parties purchase or sell sexual 
services and which is intended to satisfy the purchaser’s sexual drive. This proposal, 
particularly the idea of criminalising the person exploited by prostitution, was 
rejected and never implemented in the subsequent Government Bill, Women’s Peace. 
Only the purchase of sexual services was criminalised. The proposal was criticised 
on the basis that it was founded on a notion of two equal contractual partners. This 
view of prostitution was heavily rejected, and instead it was stated that prostitution 
is an unequal power relationship where the woman is the one who is exploited. The 
‘[...] legislative proposal stated that it is shameful and unacceptable that, in a gender-
equal society, men obtain casual sexual relations with women in return for payment 
and that Sweden, by introducing a ban on purchasing sexual services, also sent an 
important signal to other countries highlighting our outlook on purchasing sexual 
services and prostitution’.37 In addition, it was pointed out that prostitution entails 
serious harm to both individuals and to society. ‘It was expected that criminalisation 
would have a deterrent effect on prospective purchasers of sex and serve to reduce 
33 Prop. (1997/98:55) pp. 91, 135. 
34 Leijonhufvud 2015. 
35 Prop. (1997/98:55) Women’s Peace. 
36 SOU (1995:15) Sex trafficking.
37 SOU (2010:49) Government public investigations from the Ministry of Justice, Prohibition of the 
purchase of sexual services. An evaluation 1999-2008, p. 29. [our translation]
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the interest of various groups or individuals abroad in establishing more extensive 
organised prostitution activities in Sweden, which would have an inhibitory effect 
on the prevalence of prostitution here [our translation]’.38 The reason why this law is 
described and commented on here is that the requirement for voluntariness in the 
current rape legislation is considered problematic when it comes to drawing the line 
between the two crimes of rape and purchase of sexual services, and thus autonomy. 
2.4 Consent is entering the political and legal discussion
It should be emphasised that 1998 was the first time the concept of lack of consent 
as the basic requirement for criminal liability was investigated in Sweden. Ten years 
later, the issue was brought up again.39 Sixteen years after the first inquiry was initiated 
terms of reference for a new inquiry were adopted, albeit with a slightly different 
wording. The committee were to ‘consider whether a consent-based regulatory model 
for rape should be introduced’.40 The change in wording might have represented a 
breakthrough, because it opened the possibility for introducing ‘another’ basic 
requirement for criminal liability, i.e. voluntariness. As a result, the committee was 
able to circumvent the key arguments against the introduction of a lack-of-consent 
construction presented in the previous inquiries. The inquiry led to a proposal of 
voluntariness as a decisive criterion for criminal liability subsequently adopted in 
the Government Bill New Sexual Offence Legislation Based on Voluntariness,41 which 
entered into force in July 2018. For clarity, we will discuss the reports in a chronological 
order and begin with the 1998 inquiry below.
2.4.1 Sexual Offences Committee of 1998
The Sexual Offences Committee of 1998 examined, among other things, whether the 
requirement of violence or coercion for certain sexual offences should be removed 
and instead be replaced by lack of consent.42 The inquiry followed after a series of 
media reports of gang rapes which occurred in the summer of 1997 (referred to as 
the Södertälje case and the Rissne case) which led to a widespread criticism of the 
legislation at the time.43 The problem in these cases was that the ‘[...] victim had not 
passed out (which would have qualified as sexual abuse), nor was there evidence to 
show use of force or resistance by the victim (which would have qualified as rape)’.44 
38 SOU (2010:49) p. 29.  [our translation]
39 SOU (2008: 94) Evaluation of the 2005 sexual offence reform, etc.
40 SOU (2014:123) Review of the rape legislation, p. 1.
41 Prop. (2017/18: 177) A new sexual offence legislation based on voluntariness.
42 SOU (1998:48) Review of sexual offence legislation.
43 Sutorious, Den rättsliga prövningen av våldtäkt och kvinnors sexuella självbestämmanderätt – 
reflektioner med anledning av en rättsfallskommentar in Juridisk Tidskrift (1997/98) pp. 1297, 
Jokila and Niemi 2020.
44 Jokila and Niemi 2020 p. 123.
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To begin with, it should also be noted that the Committee on Sexual Offences of 1998 
did not interpret the terms of reference for the inquiry as a paradigm shift but instead 
interpreted it linearly. They placed violence and coercion at one end of this line and 
lack of consent at the other. When the inquiry then discussed arguments for each 
of these alternatives, they slipped along this line. The Sexual Offences Committee’s 
interpretations of lack of consent can be understood as follows: ‘| ...] the woman must 
have been so clear and persistent in her rejection of intercourse that the perpetrator 
deliberately puts himself above her lack of consent to intercourse [our translation 
and remark]’.45 Thereby, the Committee interpreted the terms of reference as if the 
legislation was based on lack of consent, the woman does not have to protest as much 
as she has to due to a legislation based on use of force, but it is still her primary task to 
protest. The protests do not have to be as clear as with a use of force construction, but 
they must be so clear that the lack of consent is clear to the perpetrator. Hence, the 
Sexual Offences Committee 1998 at the time did not interpret the terms of reference 
as a paradigm shift: that the person who has intercourse has an active responsibility 
to ensure that the other has consented. ‘The paradigm shift would mean that the 
woman’s primary task of protesting becomes the man’s primary task of asking’.46 
The Sexual Offences Committee 1998 balanced arguments for and against a lack of 
consent construction and considered that the use of force construction should remain. 
Instead, the inquiry proposed that criminal liability for rape should be extended to 
include abuse of a situation of helplessness. The inquiry feared retrogression of gender 
equality and referred to the Government’s efforts and measures taken in other areas 
of life to attain gender equality in society, and in particular to the Government Bill 
Women’s Peace.47 The inquiry was concerned that there would be irrelevant focus on 
the victim (the woman) in the legal process, such as the woman’s actions before, during 
and after the assault, for example that her clothes would be deemed significant with 
regard to whether consent had been given. Regarding the argument about difficulty 
in defining consent, the inquiry referred to the general grounds for freedom from 
criminal liability due to consent in SCC 24:7. The use and interpretation of consent 
in rape legislation should be compatible with the general provision. The inquiry also 
rejected the idea that it should be the perpetrator’s responsibility to make sure that he 
has consent to sexual intercourse. It was considered difficult to draft such a provision 
and it was also stated that such a provision would be in conflict with the principle that 
it is the prosecutor who bears the burden of proof in criminal cases.48 We will shortly 
see that this unthinkable construction was not so unreasonable. 
45 Svedberg 2005 p. 90.
46 Ibid. [our translation]
47 Prop. (1997/98:55).
48 Ibid.
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The 1998 inquiry was followed by the Government Bill New Sexual Offences 
Legislation.49 As a result of the Bill, sexual offence legislation underwent a 
comprehensive reform in 2005. Among other changes, the crime of rape was 
extended further. The requisite ‘sexual intercourse’ was replaced by ‘sexual act’. It 
was argued that ‘sexual intercourse’ implied reciprocity and not abuse. Furthermore, 
the definition of rape was extended to include the situation in which a person 
commits a sexual act by exploiting the other person’s inability to defend herself 
due to intoxication or a similar condition or a threatening situation. The rape laws 
at the time required the perpetrator to have caused the helplessness or a similar 
state of incapacitation, thus this did not include the situations in the Södertälje 
and Rissne cases, where the victim was gang-raped due to self-intoxication. 
2.4.2 Sexual Offences Committee of 2008
The second inquiry on the question of lack of consent or use of force was made by the 
Sexual Offences Committee of 2008.50 The committee submitted its final report in 
2010, forming the basis for the reforms of 2013.51 The inquiry referred to the Sexual 
Offences Committee of 1998. Like the previous study, the inquiry weighed up the 
pros and cons of imposing legislation based on the lack of consent. The benefits 
of a lack-of-consent construction were considered on the one hand to be a natural 
continuation of the development of sexual offences and its normative effects, such as 
a shift in focus towards the actions of the defendant and better treatment of the victim 
in the legal system, especially with regard to the police. On the other hand, the change 
was considered to increase the focus on the victim and cause difficulties in defining 
consent and in distinguishing between valid and invalid consents. In addition, it could 
result in  uncertainty of the extent of the criminalisation, unreasonable expectations 
of more convictions and an increased risk of sexual moralism. According to the 
committee, the meaning of consent should be stated directly in the legislation. The 
inquiry considered that pure consent-based legislation, i.e. lack of consent as the 
basic and only criminal element, should not be introduced. The government ‘[...] 
once again made the assessment that the disadvantages that legislation based on 
consent would entail were not outweighed by the advantages’52 presented by the 
Sexual Offences Committee of 2008. The inquiry proposed that the legislation should 
be supplemented by a subordinated crime under the heading of sexual abuse when 
the requirements for rape (i.e. violence, threats or helplessness) was not fulfilled but 




52 Nilsson, Towards voluntariness in Swedish rape laws Hyper-medialised group rape cases and 
the shift in the legal discourse in Rape in the Nordic Countries: Continuity and Change, eds. 
Heinskou, Skilbrei & Stefansen (Routledge 2020) p. 114.
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the purpose behind the inquiry’s ‘solution’ of maintaining the structure at the time 
but instead introducing a subordinated crime, was to be less provocative.53 However, 
the proposal was never implemented. Instead the wording ‘helplessness’ was replaced 
by ‘particularly vulnerable situation’. Several examples of such ‘particularly vulnerable 
situations’ were included in the new legislation, such as unconsciousness, illness, bodily 
injury or mental disturbance and with the addition ‘or otherwise in consideration 
of the circumstances’. The change was based on a number of court cases where the 
criterion ‘helpless situation’ was discussed, where the victim was not considered for 
example to be sufficiently drunk to be in a ‘helpless situation’.54 
As a way to critically analyse the inquiry, we want to pay attention to ‘[…] the way 
in which they take as given the ‘material’ for analysis’, a method inspired by Bacchi.55 
She emphasises that how a problem is presented and how the framework is set for  the 
problem can make some societal solutions possible and others impossible. According 
to Bacchi’s method ‘What’s The Problem’ one should begin with questions such as 
‘what is the problem?’; ‘what presuppositions are implied or taken for granted?’ and 
‘what effects are connected to these representations?’.56 We argue that methodological 
studies of representations of problems are important to see connections and make 
visible how certain issues are excluded from the political agenda. This approach 
require of us ‘[…] to reflect upon which issues remain unaddressed or undiscussed 
because of the ways certain ‘problems’ are represented’.57 It is hence obvious that the 
dominant problems represented in the inquiry point at not imposing a requirement 
of lack of consent. We therefore wish to draw attention to the fact that the inquiry 
takes the previous inquiry for granted and as a basis for its position.58 Other solutions 
could have emerged if the inquiry had framed the ‘problems’ differently and beyond 
single issues. One should begin by asking ‘what is the problem?’ 
Hypothetical use of What Is The Problem 1 
When the inquiries investigated the prerequisites for a change from use of force 
to lack of consent, they started by asking what is the problem with a change in 
current rape legislation? (This is hypothetically formulated)
Their answer, i.e. the problem represented, is that the victim would be at the 
centre of the legal process and that the meaning of consent is hard to define. 
Hence, the solution must be to maintain the requisite use of force.  
53 Leijonhufvud 2015.
54 SOU (2008:94).
55 Bacchi, Women, policy and politics: the construction of policy problems (Sage 1999) p. 2.
56 Bacchi 1999.
57 Bacchi 1999 p. 2.
58 See above, Svedberg’s critique of the Sexual Offences Committee of 1998 interpretation of the 
inquiry terms of reference.
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This line of argument is logical and therefore easy to find convincing. What we 
suggest, when using Bacchi’s method, is that the problem could have been formulated 
differently, and then other solutions could have followed the inquiries. 
Hypothetical use of What Is The Problem 2 
When the inquiries investigated the prerequisites for a change from use of force 
to lack of consent, they started by asking: what is the problem with the current 
rape legislation? (This is hypothetically formulated)
Their answer, i.e. the problem represented, could then have been that current 
rape legislation presupposes that the female body is available until she protests. 
This, in turn, means that she is made responsible for the criminal act not taking 
place.59
Hence, the solution would then have been for responsibility for the criminal act 
being placed on the perpetrator, by changing the requisite use of force to (lack 
of) consent, i.e. the perpetrator should make sure that the sexual act is mutual. 
In this context Wegerstad’s analysis of how problems related to sexual offences are 
represented and affect legal reforms could serve as an example of feminist legal 
research related to this method. She describes the historical reforms concerning how 
to define the rape act as a shift from bodily harm to violation of personal and sexual 
integrity.60 However, she also emphasised that the Women’s Peace inquiry,61 compared 
to previous reforms, had an opposite perspective of sexual abuses. The inquiry’s 
problem formulation is instead based on women’s experiences and sexualised 
violence, where the prerequisite ‘sexualised violence’ is based on a description of a 
societal problem on a structural level. Wegerstad’s conclusion is that the first half 
of the 2000s was focusing on the harmful act and that this was based on the acting 
subject’s bodily expression of sexual drive, but then changed into what the act does 
to the victim, i.e. violation of integrity. Further, she concludes that sexual offences in 
general are created through two different problem formulations. On the one hand, 
sexual crime is constructed as a matter of gender-based violence, where sexual crime 
is a gender equality problem that is described as men’s violence against women. On 
the other hand, sexual crimes are constructed as a matter of sexuality, in which sexual 
crimes are instead a universal and individual problem. According to Wegerstad, it is 
the latter (problem) formulation that has an impact on the reform in 2005, and also 
on the reform in 2013.62 
59 See the opening quote of the article.
60 Wegerstad 2015 p. 166.
61 SOU (1995:60) Women’s Peace. Note that the inquiry report and the Government Bill have the 
same title. 
62 Wegerstad 2015 p. 186.
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3. The current rape legislation – general reflections
3.1 Introduction
In this section we describe and discuss the new criminal legislation on rape that 
entered into force on the 1 July 2018, characterised by voluntariness instead of use 
of force being the central criterion. This section have five parts following the general 
introduction. The first is a more in-depth introduction to the new legal construction 
of rape (3.2). The second highlights important aspects from the discussions in the 
legislative process stemming from the Sexual Offences Committee of 2014 (3.3). In 
the third part we address some specific aspects of the legal construction concerning 
some linguistic and normative shifts (3.4). In the fourth part we discuss some issues 
related to the application of the new legislation (3.5), and in the last part we introduce 
a discussion on autonomy (3.6). We start out in the previous and new legislation as a 
backdrop for the coming discussions, see figure below. 
Figure 2.
Rape SCC 6:1 (before the 1st of July 2018) Rape SCC 6:1 (after the 1 st of July 2018) Negligent rape SCC 6:1 a (after the 1st of July 2018)
A person who, by violence or use of force or by threat which
involves an offence, forces another person to have sexual
intercourse or to engage in another sexual act that in the view of
the seriousness of the violation is comparable to enforced sexual
intercourse, shall be sentenced for rape to imprisonment for at
least two and at most six years.
The same shall apply to a person who carries out sexual intercourse
or a sexual act, that in accordance with paragraph one is
comparable to sexual intercourse, by improperly exploiting that a
person is in a particularly vulnerable situation due to
unconsciousness, sleep, grave fear, the influence of alcohol or
drugs, illness, bodily injury, mental disturbance or otherwise in view
of the circumstances.
If an offence referred to in the first or second paragraph, in view of
the circumstances associated with the offence, is considered less
serious, the person is guilty of rape and is sentenced to
imprisonment for at most four years.
If an offence referred to in the first or second paragraph is
considered gross, the person is guilty of gross rape and is sentenced
to imprisonment for at least four and at most ten years. When
assessing whether the offence is gross, particular consideration is
given to whether the perpetrator used violence or a threat of a
particularly serious nature, or whether more than one person
assaulted the victim or tool part in the assault in some other way or
whether, in view of the method used or otherwise, the perpetrator
exhibited particular ruthlessness or brutality. (2013:365)
A person who performs sexual intercourse, or some other sexual
act that in the view of the seriousness of the violation is
comparable to sexual intercourse, with a person who is not
participating voluntarily is guilty of rape and is sentenced to
imprisonment for at least two and at most six years. When
assessing whether participation is voluntary or not, particular
consideration is given to whether voluntariness was expressed by
word or deed or in some other way. A person can never be
considered to be participating voluntarily if:
1. Their participation is a result of assault, other violence or
threat of a criminal act, a threat to bring a prosecution against
or report another person for an offence, or a threat to give
detrimental information about another person;
2. The perpetrator improperly exploits the fact that the person
is in a particularly vulnerable situation due to
unconsciousness, sleep, grave fear, the influence of alcohol or
drugs, illness, bodily injury, mental disturbance or otherwise in
view of the circumstances; or
3. The perpetrator induces the person to participate by seriously
abusing the person’s position of dependence on the
perpetrator.
If, in view of the circumstances associated with the offence,
the offence is considered less serious, the person is guilty of
rape and is sentenced to imprisonment for at most four years.
If an offence referred to in the first paragraph is considered
gross, the person is guilty of gross rape and is sentenced to
imprisonment for at least five and at most ten years. When
assessing whether the offence is gross, particular
consideration is given to whether the perpetrator used
violence or a threat of a particularly serious nature, or
whether more than one person assaulted the victim or took
part in the assault in some other way, or whether, in view of
the method used or the young age of the victim or otherwise,
the perpetrator exhibited particular ruthlessness or brutality.
(Act 2018:618)
A person who commits an act referred to in Section 1 
and is grossly negligent regarding the circumstance 
that the other person is not participating voluntarily is 
guilty of negligent rape and is sentenced to 
imprisonment for at most four years.
It, in the view of the circumstances, the act is less 
serious, the person is not held responsible. Act 
2018:618. person who commits an act referred to in 
Section 1 and is grossly negligent regarding the 
circumstance that the other person is not participating 
voluntarily is guilty of negligent rape and is sentenced 
to imprisonment for at most four years.
It, in the view of the circumstances, the act is less
serious, the person is not held responsible. Act
2018:618.
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The new regulation of the offence, in SCC 6:1, is defined as:63 
‘A person who performs sexual intercourse, or some other sexual act that in the view of the 
seriousness of the violation is comparable to sexual intercourse, with a person who is not 
participating voluntarily is guilty of rape and is sentenced to imprisonment for at least 
two and at most six years. When assessing whether participation is voluntary or not, 
particular consideration is given to whether voluntariness was expressed by word or deed 
or in some other way. A person can never be considered to be participating voluntarily if:
1.     Their participation is a result of assault, other violence or threat of a criminal act, a 
threat to bring a prosecution against or report another person for an offence, or a threat 
to give detrimental information about another person;
2.       The perpetrator improperly exploits the fact that the person is in a particularly 
vulnerable situation due to unconsciousness, sleep, grave fear, the influence of alcohol 
or drugs, illness, bodily injury, mental disturbance or otherwise in view of the 
circumstances; or
3.       The perpetrator induces the person to participate by seriously abusing the person’s 
position of dependence on the perpetrator.
If, in view of the circumstances associated with the offence, the offence is considered 
less serious, the person is guilty of rape and is sentenced to imprisonment for at most 
four years.
If an offence referred to in the first paragraph is considered gross, the person is guilty of 
gross rape and is sentenced to imprisonment for at least five and at most ten years. When 
assessing whether the offence is gross, particular consideration is given to whether the 
perpetrator used violence or a threat of a particularly serious nature, or whether more 
than one person assaulted the victim or took part in the assault in some other way, or 
whether, in view of the method used or the young age of the victim or otherwise, the 
perpetrator exhibited particular ruthlessness or brutality. (Act 2018:618)’
3.2 Introduction to the legal regulation of rape 
3.2.1 The decisive criterion – not participating voluntarily
The new legal construction of rape means that the boundary between a legal and 
illegal act is now decided by whether the participation in a sexual act is voluntary or 
not, i.e., the legal construction requires that someone performs ‘sexual intercourse 
or similar’64 with a person who does not participate voluntary. This includes two 
situations: 1) a person has not by free will decided to participate in ‘sexual intercourse 
or similar’, meaning that someone has not by word or deed expressed a ‘yes’; or 2) a 
person has by free will decided not to participate in ‘sexual intercourse or similar’, 
63 The translations of the current legislation is found at <https://www.regeringen.se/rattsliga-
dokument/departementsserien-och-promemorior/1999/01/ds-199936/>. [the authors italics 
and underlining]
64    The definition of the sexual act was neither discussed nor changed in this most recent 
reform, and will therefore not be dealt with in this part. These discussions have been 
analysed in previous legislative processes and in the previous section. ‘Sexual intercourse 
or similar’ is simplified and refers to the required element in the regulation of rape. 
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meaning a person has expressed a ‘no’.65 The assessment of the voluntariness should 
be based on the situation as a whole.66 This construction has been criticised on the 
grounds that the boundary between voluntary and non-voluntary participation is 
unclear and cannot be ascertained until afterwards.67 Additionally, the inner will of 
a person not to participate in a sexual act if the person has in fact agreed to it, is 
not enough as grounds for criminal responsibility.68 This has been interpreted as a 
situation where someone has expressed voluntariness in some way even though she 
did not really want to participate. The determining factor is whether she was able 
make a free decision or not. The Government held that this is a way to use one’s sexual 
self-determination, to choose to do something one would rather avoid.69 This is an 
interesting view of self-determination and closely linked to the idea of autonomy, and 
will be discussed more in section 4. The participation must be voluntary when the 
sexual act is carried out and the whole time.70 
3.2.2 A particular criterion to clarify how to assess voluntariness
The second sentence states that in the assessment of whether the participation has 
been voluntary or not, expression of voluntariness by words or deed shall be taken into 
special account. Examples of such deeds given in the preparatory work are facial 
expressions or body language.71 This means that a crucial part of the legal assessment 
must include the question of what the victim has or has not expressed. Note that 
there is no requirement that such an expression must have taken place under the 
participation to be voluntary, which means that being passive can also constitute 
voluntary participation. The Sexual Offences Committee of 2014 suggested that the 
offence of rape should contain a requirement for expression of the voluntariness, 
which would mean that tacit consent would be void. The committee held that allowing 
for tacit consent to be sufficient would risk increasing prejudice about passivity in 
sexual relations and would make it impossible to distinguish frozen fright, illness 
or drunkenness from passive consent, ending up in a situation where only a ‘no’ is 
a ‘no’.72 In the end, the Government decided not to adopt such a requirement but to 
adopt a modified version. The purpose of the second sentence is to underline that the 
point of departure must be that voluntariness to participate in a sexual activity will 
be expressed in some way and that the absence of such expressions normally should 
65 Wennberg, Befogad kritik av det nya våldtäktsbrottet? in Juridisk tidskrift (2018/19) pp. 298-304, 
p. 300.
66 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 78.
67 Council on Legislation statement (23.01.2018) p. 4 f. 
68 Prop. (2017/18:177) s. 78. 
69 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 33, see also Gustafsson Yakoub, Två sätt att tolka det nya våldtäktsbrottet 
in Svensk juristtidning (2020) p. 110.
70 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 78 f. 
71 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 80. 
72 SOU (2016:60).
Bergen Journal of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice • 2/2020
113
be interpreted as non-voluntariness. Tacit consent might, in exceptional cases, be 
enough to not constitute rape.73 
3.2.3 Three situations when voluntariness is void
It should be noted that voluntariness, irrespective of whether and how it has been 
expressed, is not valid in three specific situations mentioned in the third sentence of 
SCC 6:1: A person can never be considered to be participating voluntary if: 1. Their 
participation is a result of assault, other violence or threat of a criminal act, a threat 
to bring a prosecution against or report another person for an offence, or a threat to 
give detrimental information about another person (use of force); or 2. The perpetrator 
improperly exploits the fact that the person is in a particularly vulnerable situation due to 
unconsciousness, sleep, grave fear, the influence of alcohol or drugs, illness, bodily injury, 
mental disturbance or otherwise in view of the circumstances (particular vulnerable 
situation) or; 3. The perpetrator induces the person to participate by seriously abusing 
the person’s position of dependence on the perpetrator (a serious abuse of a person’s 
position of dependence). Even if a person has agreed to sex, it does not necessarily mean 
that the participation is voluntary. The situations mentioned above aims at situations 
where a person is not capable of protecting, or at least has limited options to protect, 
her sexual integrity and express her own will.74 Wennberg stresses that this part of 
the regulatory framework is not relevant in situations where a person said ‘no’ or did 
not make up her mind in such a way that the participation was not voluntary.75 In the 
draft version of the offence, the third sentence had a slightly different beginning: ‘an 
expressed choice to participate in sexual intercourse is not voluntary if […]’. This was 
meant to strengthen the legal protection of sexual integrity, but the committee found 
it contradictory to include sleep and unconsciousness under paragraph 2 if related to 
an expressed will, and decided to omit these situations.76 The committee also argued 
that not all situations of sleep should constitute rape. Cases of close relationships 
where sexual acts could be initiated when one of the parties was asleep should not 
necessarily fall within the scope of the offence. The discussions led to the removal of 
the initial formulation of an expressed choice, being replaced by a sentence stating that 
a person can never participate voluntarily if the circumstances in paragraphs 1-3 are 
applicable. In the Government Bill, it is argued that some sexual acts carried out in 
a close relationship when someone is asleep do not constitute improper exploitation 
and would hence not fall within the scope of the offence of rape.77 Wennberg finds 
this illogical and holds that these situations should fall under the first sentence of the 
offence, i.e. she is not participating voluntarily. In this sense Wennberg agrees with 
the critique that the construction of the offence is unclear, but underlines that this 
73 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 80. 
74 Prop. (2017/18:177).
75 Wennberg 2018/19, pp. 298-304, p. 302 f. 
76 Prop. (2017/18:177), see also Wennberg 2018/19 p. 303.
77 Prop. (2017/18:177).
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particular situation is peripheral.78 
Additionally, we wish to address another illogical aspect regarding these three 
situations where voluntariness is void. If this means that a participation can never be 
voluntary and hence must constitute rape, we ask the law - what about prostitution? 
How does these three exceptions relate to the prohibition of purchase of sexual 
services?  It seems as the financial payment overrides the lack of voluntariness as 
described in paragraphs1-3.79 
3.3 Some aspects from the discussions in the preparatory works
This section highlights some of the main arguments and discussions from the 
preparatory works for today’s rape legislation. It is a continuation of the previous 
reviews of inquiries, and hence the third inquiry we discuss in this article. The 
purpose of the reform was ‘to clarify that every person has an unconditional right to 
personal and sexual integrity and sexual self-determination’.80 This clarification was 
made through the change in the decisive criterion from use of force to voluntariness. 
  
The referral bodies raised questions of a varied nature: some of them asked how to 
define a sexual act, and whether voluntariness must be re-expressed between sexual 
acts when one sexual act leads on to another; one pointed to a risk of extended 
criminal legal responsibility in practice, especially if combined with a responsibility 
for negligence. Another pointed to that in cases of passivity, the most serious situations 
of lack of voluntariness will fall under the regulation of negligent rape. Other referral 
bodies expressed concerns about situations where someone initially participates 
voluntarily, enters a state of frozen fright and becomes unable to express that he or 
she no longer wishes to participate voluntarily.81
The Swedish Government emphasised that the word ‘participation’ includes 
both activity and passivity, but argued that a requirement for voluntariness to 
be communicated in some way would ensure that pure passivity would never be 
interpreted as a voluntary participation. This would also make the point of departure 
clearer for the law enforcement authorities. But the Government went on to state that 
such a requirement could lead to a situation where a person in some way expresses 
voluntariness although she does not wish to participate and the perpetrator suspects 
78 Wennberg 2018/19 p. 304.
79 It can be noted that the offence of rape may be applicable in cases of trafficking, but also in 
other cases, especially when the buyer has used a large amount of force. We will return to this 
discussion briefly in the next section. 
80 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 1.
81 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 29 f.
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this is the case.82 The Government argued that the right to sexual self-determination 
includes both a right to decide whether to participate in sexual practices or not and 
also to respond to sexual approaches in any way one wishes, including by passivity. 
The Government held that this means that the legal construction should not include 
any requirement regarding how persons are to express their voluntary participation 
in sexual practices and left this issue to the judiciary to decide in each case.83 
On the one hand, the Government emphasised that it is the responsibility of the 
perpetrator to ensure that the sexual act is mutual. On the other hand, it emphasised 
that in the assessment of whether participation is voluntary or not (in the eyes of the 
perpetrator) the inner will of the victim is irrelevant, what matters is what the victim 
has communicated. This means that what the victim expressed or did not express is 
crucial in the assessment of the perpetrator’s criminal responsibility. The Government 
stressed that if a person chose to participate in sexual activities against her will, and 
the perpetrator did not use force or exploited the victim’s vulnerable situation, the act 
is legal. The Government argued that a result of this is that a situation where someone 
successfully pesters about sex falls outside the scope of rape.84 The Government also 
argued that a situation when the victim initially participated voluntarily and then 
entered a state of frozen fright cannot fall under the rape legislation.85 The line of 
arguments addresses and recognises the complexity of autonomy, which we will 
return to briefly below. 
3.4 The legal construction - linguistic and normative shifts
 
In this section we will make some general comments on the new regulatory 
framework due to previous discussions and criticism that has been in focus. The shift 
in discourse the last a decade and a half, from use of force towards voluntariness, is 
now established in Swedish law. The change implies a transfer of responsibility for the 
criminal act from the victim to the perpetrator.86 The change also has an important 
normative symbolic value as it establishes that (female) bodies are unavailable until 
the moment the woman says ‘yes’, whereas previous legislation tended to assume that 
female bodies were available until the woman said ‘no’. This could also be described 
as an end of an era (hopefully) in the context of rape legislation, with what Eduards 
describes as the female common feature of being sexually accessible to men.87 
Regarding the change of wording, from the more established lack of consent to 
82 Ibid. p. 31.
83 Ibid. p. 32-33.
84 Ibid. p. 33.
85 Ibid. p. 29 f.
86 In line with the paradigm shift Svedberg asked for in 2005, see above under chapter 2 and 
Svedberg 2005.
87 Eduards, Kroppspolitik om moder Svea och andra kvinnor (Atlas akademi 2005).
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voluntariness, the main reason for this change was the risk of confusion in relation 
to the general ground for freedom from criminal liability due to consent in SCC 
24:7.88 The motivation seems reasonable in a Swedish legal context, but we would 
like to make some comments on the importance of choice of words by addressing the 
recent discussion in Denmark. As Vestergaard analyses in depth in his article,89 the 
Penal Code Committee has been debating the choice of the two concepts, consent or 
voluntariness, as the decisive criterion in the new construction of rape in Danish law. 
Noteworthy here is that Denmark does not have a rule of consent as a general ground 
for freedom from responsibility.90 The majority of the Danish committee suggested 
a legal construction based on voluntariness, with the wording ‘every individual has 
the right to sexual self-determination and [that] every sexual act must be based on 
“mutual”, whereas, they argued that the concept of consent refers to an agreement 
situation that seems to require some formal stages.91 As an effect, the majority held that 
this would risk overly extensive criminalisation. The minority of the committee, on 
the other hand, argued that voluntariness points ‘in the direction of one’s fulfilment of 
the other’s desire’.92 This argument is in line with feminist critique of ideas of passive 
female sexuality and active male sexuality. We agree on this latter linguistic approach 
with regard to the Danish legislative debate.93 Similar discussions can be traced in 
the legislative work regarding the change from ‘sexual intercourse’ to ‘sexual act’ in 
Swedish rape laws in 2005.94 
88 The provision in SCC 24:7 set up several criteria that must be fulfilled. The provision on 
consent as a ground for freedom from responsibility would, for example, exclude situations 
when consent has been given without full insight into the relevant circumstances, and could 
hence lead to criminal responsibility. If the legal construction of rape was built on the same 
concept, situations where the perpetrator has been lying about use of contraceptives or sexually 
transmitted infections or had falsely promised to engage in a love affair could be defined as rape, 
see prop. (2017/18:177) p. 30 f. 
89 Vestergaard, The rape law revision in Denmark: Consent or voluntariness as the key criterion?, 




93 The Danish legislative process led to revised rape legislation in September 2020, based on 
consent, as the minority suggested. The consent must be given voluntarily as an expression of the 
person’s free will. More on the Danish legislative debate in Vestergaard’s article, see Vestergaard 
2020. 
94 Prop. (2004/05) p. 45.
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3.5 Before the court
Cases of rape are often to a large extent based on supportive evidence and the parties’ 
testimonies. One effect is that the question of credibility is placed at the core of 
the trial.95 One crucial concern in relation to the new offence of rape is the risk of 
an expanded focus on the victim and her behaviour, due to the requirement that 
establishes that ‘when assessing whether participation is voluntary or not, particular 
consideration is given to whether voluntariness was expressed in word or deed or 
in some other way’.96 The Government, on the other hand rejected such concerns, 
and argued that the new regulatory framework rather focus on the perpetrator, and 
refered to Scotland and Canada.97 
The expressed concerns are closely linked to rape myths. Rape myths have been 
defined as ‘prejudicial, stereotyped, or false beliefs about rape, rape victims, and 
rapists’,98 expanded a decade later to include ‘attitudes and beliefs that are generally 
false but are widely and persistently held, and that serve to deny and justify male 
sexual aggression against women’.99 A recent definition underlines both the content 
and function of these myths in the judiciary: ‘descriptive or prescriptive beliefs about 
sexual aggression (i.e. about its scope, causes, context and consequences) that serve 
to deny, downplay or justify sexually aggressive behaviour that men commit against 
women’.100
Feminist legal research has dealt with the reproduction of gendered stereotypes in cases 
concerning rape and the role of rape myths in the application of rape legislation.101 One 
of the strongest rape myths is the one about ‘real rape’. A ‘real rape’ is committed through 
95 Andersson 2004; Finch & Munro, Juror Stereotypes and Blame Attribution in Rape Cases 
Involving Intoxicants, 45(1) The British Journal of Criminology (2005) pp. 25-38, Saunders, Rape 
as ‘one person’s word against another’s’: Challenging the conventional wisdom, in the International 
Journal of Evidence and Proof (2018) <https://doi.org/10.1177/1365712718766478>. A recent 
report from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) also concludes that the 
lack of evidence is even more pronounced in cases of negligent rape, see BRÅ report (2020).
96 SCC 6:1.
97 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 22.
98 Burt, Cultural myths and supports for rape, 38(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 
(1980) pp. 217-230.
99 Lonsway & Fitzgerald, Rape Myths. In review, 18(2) Psychology of Women Quarterly (1994) pp. 
133-164, p. 134.
100 Gerger, Kley, Bohner, & Siebler, The Acceptance of Modern Myths about Sexual Aggression 
(AMMSA) scale: Development and validation in German and English, 33(5) Aggressive 
Behaviour (2007) pp. 422-440, p. 423.
101 MacKinnon 2016, Bitsch, The Geography of Rape: Shaming Narratives in Norwegian Rape 
Cases, 44(4) Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society (2019) pp. 931-953, Burman 2009, 
Temkin et al. 2018, Smith and Skinner, How Rape Myths Are Used and Challenged in Rape and 
Sexual Assault Trials, 26(4) Social & Legal Studies (2017) pp. 441-466. 
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assault, carried out outside, in a public place, between strangers.102 A majority of the court 
cases concern other types of rapes.103 In relation to this we wish to link the discussion on 
rape myths to critique of the low rate of convictions compared to other types of crimes 
that has been presented in public debate. This problem might be a question of application, 
rather than the legal construction of the crime, but these two are interrelated and must be 
seen as a whole. Therefore, it is relevant to note that a report from the Swedish National 
Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), in which almost 400 judgments were reviewed, 
shows that the number of convictions in rape cases has increased considerably from 155 
in 2017 to 297 in 2019.104 This means that rates of convictions are almost twice as high 
when the courts are applying the new construction of rape, i.e. built on voluntariness, 
compared to the old one that was based on use of force. It is too early to draw any firm 
conclusions at this point, but it might be an indication of a legal construction that is more 
effective. The result could also imply that the room for rape myths might be demarcated 
- the construction is mirroring the lived reality, i.e. is more in line with the victim’s 
experiences. 
3.6 Ideas of autonomy - some notes on the requisite of voluntariness
 
Criminal law is founded on an idea of the liberal subject. The new Swedish rape 
legislation is constructed in line with this presupposition about the individual. By 
using voluntariness as the decisive criterion, the offence clearly builds on the view of 
two equal parties, in line with the liberal view of the individual, free to make their own 
choices.105 In opposition to this presupposition, the legislation also addresses three 
situations where unequal powers are recognised, being of such a serious character 
that the power imbalances must be taken into account. Expressions of voluntariness 
in these situations are void. These situations are serious violations of the victim’s 
right to self-determination and personal as well as sexual integrity, suggesting that 
the legislation on rape acknowledges that the autonomy of the victim is sometimes 
violated/threatened/weakened. What we do wish to discuss briefly below is the idea 
of autonomy in relation to situations other than the three mentioned here and those 
102 Estrich, Real Rape (Harvard University Press 1987) and Bohner, Eyssel, Siebler & Viki, Rape 
myth acceptance: Cognitive, affective and behavioural effects of beliefs that blame victim and 
exonerate the perpetrator in Rape: Challenging Contemporary Thinking, eds. Horvath and Brown 
(Willan Publishing 2009) pp. 17-45. 
103 Polismyndigheten och Åklagarmyndigheten, Våldsbrott i när relationer och sexualbrott mot 
vuxna -En gemensam granskning av polisens och åklagarens handläggning (2019), see also 
Brottsförebyggande rådet, Våldtäkt från anmälan till dom. En studie av rättsväsendets arbete med 
våldtäktsärenden (2019).
104 BRÅ (2020).
105 For a discussion on the liberal subject in criminal law, see for example Andersson 2004, Burman 
2011, Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects. Feminist essays on legal and societal theory (Hardt Publishing 
1998).
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who are included in the criminal offence of rape. There are many situations between 
the voluntary and the non-voluntary which is mentioned as an exception in paragraph 
1-3, where a person does not have access to full autonomy. We hold that this is a grey 
area, where the autonomy of a person, i.e. the possibility of using one’s right to self-
determination is delimited, in one way or another, due to for example capabilities 
or unequal relations.106 Some of these situations might fall within the scope of the 
offence of rape, in a particular case, some of them might be included in other sexual 
offences, and other situations might fall outside the scope of sexual offences. We do 
not argue that all these situations should be included as part of the offence of rape, but 
want to highlight and problematise some of the consequences of a legal construction 
of rape based on non-voluntariness that builds on an idea of the liberal subject.
As follows with the examples given above from discussions in the preparatory work, 
the Government recognised some of these grey areas, and addresses structural 
perspectives in part, for example in the discussion on cases when the victim entered 
a state of frozen fright or did not actually want to participate but decided to do so 
anyway. In the end, the Government fell back on the liberal idea of the autonomous 
subject, stating that if a person chose to participate in sexual activities against her will, 
and the perpetrator did not use force or exploit the victim’s vulnerable situation, the 
act is legal. 
4. Rethinking voluntariness - autonomy and beyond
4.1 Introduction
In this section we will make some reflections and comments on the new construction 
of rape and point to some examples in the preparatory works that call for further 
analysis on the requisite of voluntariness and the idea of autonomy that the legislation 
builds upon. We use an everyday-life perspective which relates to a theoretical con-
cept, lived autonomy, that we will develop in an upcoming article. We start by intro-
ducing an everyday life perspective and then apply the perspective to some concrete 
examples that we draw from the legislative process.
106 This can be discussed in relation to the capabilities that Nussbaum argues should be supported in 
all democracies, see Nussbaum, Kvinnors liv och social rättvisa: ett försvar för universella värden 
(Daidalos 2002). 
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4.2 Our theoretical starting points
We take our point of departure in critique on the law as a detached and closed system, 
that at the same time claims to define and mirror the social world with legal concepts, 
criteria and the right methods.107 MacKinnon argues that the legal inability to define 
legal reality in terms of social reality serves as one explanation for the challenges in 
court.108 Naffine has also addressed the problem of not taking women’s everyday lives 
as the point of departure in discussions of rape, by questioning why the harm caused 
by rape is described in abstract terms instead of women’s lived experiences.109 
Legal research in women’s law has traditionally taken its point of departure in 
women’s lives and experiences, but ‘everyday life’ as a theoretical analytical concept 
was introduced by Svedberg in 2013 showing how an everyday life perspective can be 
used in legal research.110 
She points out that this concept is useful also in legal research where it is applicable, 
statutory regulation should therefore take its starting point in people’s living 
conditions, in order to be able to obtain gender equality.111 The everyday life perspective 
suggests that we must leave the liberal (white, middle-class, western, male) idea of the 
autonomous subject behind in order to be able to offer women protection, to secure 
the right to personal and sexual integrity and sexual self-determination.112 Instead 
we must take our point of departure in women’s everyday lives and, hence, anchored 
in the social world. This implies an understanding of voluntariness, e.g. the ability 
to say ‘yes’ and ‘no’, that depends on the situation the person is part of. It should 
be noted that the concept of an everyday life perspective in law does not take its 
point of departure in the individual, but in a structural perspective. In this sense, it is 
appropriate to explore structural challenges pointed out by previous feminist research. 
This approach embraces the power relationships, and implies that an individual’s 
autonomy can both increase and decrease in the situational and relational context.113 
107 See for example MacKinnon 2016; Naffine 2009; Smart, Feminism and the power of law 
(Routledge 1989); Bladini 2013; Svedberg 2013, Björling, Rättstillämpningens tystnad. En 
rättsvetenskaplig narratologisk studie om argumentation och rättsliga uttryck inom civilprocessen 




111 Ibid. p. 54.
112 Compare Nedelsky 2011, especially chapter 5.
113 The idea of elasticity in relation to autonomy is not alien in law. One example is the Sales of 
Goods Act, which requires the buyer to have fulfilled her obligation to examine the item for sale 
in order to be able to later on make a complaint if the goods are defective. This obligation may 
be extensive or reduced depending on the circumstances at the time of purchase.
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4.3 Examples of challenges due to an everyday life perspective
So, let us now examine the new legal construction of rape through the lens of an 
everyday life perspective, which is founded in lived experiences and aims at 
strengthening the ability to define legal reality in terms of lived reality. The decisive 
criterion of rape is now voluntary participation in sexual intercourse. The prerequisite 
of voluntariness will be at the centre of the analysis. The further discussion/analysis 
will also touch upon the interests protected by the legislation, i.e. the (women’s) right 
to personal and sexual integrity as well as a right to sexual self-determination. 
Previous feminist critique has pointed to the gap between the abstract legal concepts 
and the lived reality that the law is supposed to regulate, and underlined the 
importance of including women’s everyday life experiences in the legislative process 
on rape.114 Therefore, with this new rape legislation based on voluntariness that aims 
at strengthening women’s personal and sexual integrity and sexual self-determination 
is a result of hard work from women’s lobbying in mind, we wish to return to the 
questions that we posed in the introduction. The question is which assumptions 
are made about what the interests to protect are (and are not) and the second, how 
they are best protected. With the previous critique as a backdrop, we answer these 
questions from an everyday life perspective. We look into whose knowledge and 
whose experiences that are used in the legislative process and what it means for those 
who are supposed to be protected by the law. 
Inner will and passivity
The first example we wish to highlight is the discussion on the prerequisite of 
voluntariness in relation to inner will and passivity. One interesting aspect in the 
preparatory works that we wish to draw attention to is the way inner will is dealt 
with. A situation where a person does not wish to participate in a sexual act but has 
explicitly agreed to participate despite the fact that she does not really want to, does 
not constitute rape.115 It should be mentioned that the determining factor suggested 
in the preparatory works is whether she was able to make a free decision or not. 
Examples given of situations where a free decision cannot be made are equated to 
the exceptions made in the third sentence (use of force, threats or exploitation of 
a vulnerable situation), or in situations when the victim was caught off guard (by 
a doctor at a medical examination or by a stranger at a festival.).116 Additionally, it 
was pointed out that pressure or persuasion that leads to consent does not constitute 
rape. The Government argued that the choice to do something that someone wishes 
to avoid is part of someone’s sexual self-determination. This example is clearly an 
expression of traditional autonomy, and we argue that it is made by a male rationale. 
We wish to emphasise that the arguments could be turned around. The right not 
114  See for example MacKinnon 2016 and Naffine 2009.
115  Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 78.
116  Prop. (2017/18:177).
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to participate if that is in line with the victim’s inner will, i.e. to have access to and 
be able to uphold the inner will despite pressure and social norms is an important 
part of the path towards a strengthened protection of women’s right to sexual self-
determination. This would better protect women’s right to sexual self-determination 
from the experiences of women’s everyday lives.117
The initial suggestion of the legal construction of rape was to include not only the 
prerequisite of voluntariness, but also a requirement of an expression of voluntariness. 
This would clearly express the responsibility for the instigating party to ensure that 
the other person was participating voluntarily, and the normative message would be 
that the sexual intercourse must be a mutual act. This suggestion was rejected and 
changed into the assessment prerequisite, i.e. the criterion to clarify the assessment 
of the voluntariness through expressions of voluntary participation. Note that there 
is no requirement for such expression, which means that passive participation could 
also constitute voluntary participation.118 This was also argued to be a part of sexual 
self-determination, to decide how to express the voluntariness, including doing so by 
passivity. However, the committee seems to have taken a lived autonomy perspective119 
and highlighted that such allowance of passivity would risk growing prejudice about 
female sexual passivity and also make it hard to differ from frozen fright, illness or 
drunkenness.120 
Intercourse or similar acts with a sleeping spouse/partner
The second example is arguments on intercourse or similar acts with a sleeping spouse/
partner in relation to a discussion on the draft version of the exceptions in the third 
sentence, as illustrated above in chapter 3. The draft formulation concerning the three 
situations when voluntariness is void, started as: ‘an expressed choice to participate in 
sexual intercourse is not voluntary if […]’. The aim was to strengthen the protection 
of sexual integrity, but the committee found it contradictory to include sleep and 
unconsciousness under paragraph 2 if it related to an expressed will and decided to 
omit these situations.121 In addition, and this is perhaps the most interesting part of 
this discussion, the committee held that to perform a sexual act with a sleeping partner 
should not always constitute rape and referred to close relationships where this could 
occur. We would like to argue that this line of argument seems to be primarily made 
from a male perspective, or men’s everyday life, rather than from that of the women 
whose sexual integrity the regulation aims to protect. 
117 See for example Munro 2015.
118 Prop. (2017/18:177) p. 80.
119 The discussion on voluntariness from an everyday life perspective is, as mentioned in the 
introduction to this section, closely linked to the wider concept of autonomy. We argue that 
different understandings of autonomy are important analytical tools in a discussion on rape 
legislation. We suggest an understanding of autonomy as a lived autonomy. 
120 SOU (2016:60). 
121 Prop. (2017/18:177).
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The relationship between rape and the prohibition of purchase of sexual services
The third example concerns the relation between the two offences, rape and the 
prohibition of purchase of sexual services, both regulated in Chapter 6 of the SCC. 
We argue that these offences overlap, to a greater degree than what is recognised in 
the preparatory works and in application of the law. It could also be mentioned that 
the offence of purchase of sexual services is complementary to the offence of rape, 
even if they are mainly discussed in different terms when it comes to the interests to 
be protected by the legislation. The prohibition of purchase of sexual services mainly 
addresses public order as an important interest to be protected, and the victim is 
not regularly part in the process, and hence lacks the right to legal counsel in these 
cases, even if the lawmakers recognise the risk of the seller being in a vulnerable 
situation.122 This analysis is partly of a different character and could be the subject of 
an article on its own, but we will just address it briefly here and pose some questions 
concerning the view of autonomy that might be revealed behind the two offences. We 
will also make some general comments on the lack of a common ground for these 
two offences, especially in terms of autonomy. In the preparatory works for the new 
rape legislation the relationship between these two crimes is only mentioned in the 
situation when the seller is also a victim of trafficking and this is a fact that the buyer 
should know about. Read conversely, this should mean that all other situations fall 
outside the scope of the legislation, as long as the sexual act has not exceeded the 
limits of violence agreed upon. Such an interpretation builds on the idea of going into 
prostitution being a free choice in all other situations, or at least not a particularly 
vulnerable situation, a result of the traditional view of autonomy. We argue, by taking 
our point of departure in the everyday lives of the women who have been active in 
prostitution, that prostitution is (almost) never a free choice made by a person through 
her traditional autonomy but is a result of trauma after previous experiences of sexual 
violence, mental illness, poverty or other severe vulnerable situations. 123 Yet this is 
not recognised in the preparatory work for the new rape legislation. Another aspect 
of autonomy that should be mentioned here is that sexual autonomy is supposed to 
be protected by the offence of rape, whereas it seems to be another conception of 
autonomy prevailing in the context of purchasing sexual services. In such cases will 
economic interests and an economic rationale trump the violation of the personal 
and sexual integrity committed by the non-voluntary sexual act.124 The economic gain 
hence compensates for the injuries to body and soul and can be read as an expression 
of the (male) division of human beings into body and mind, where the mind prevails, 
122 Prop. (2017/18:177).
123 See #intedinhora at intedinhora.se for testimonies on how and why these women ended up 
in prostitution. #Intedinhora is a network of Swedish women with experience of commercial 
sexual exploitation and their work aims to stop people from being exploited in prostitution. 
124 In this article we do not discuss the fact that women in prostitution have a much harder time 
claiming their rights in a rape case, which is a very important aspect of the application of the 
legislation, but at the periphery of the discussion here. Although we recommend the reader to 
see Bitsch 2019 for such an analysis. 
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and the body is made invisible or just neglected. This is closely linked to Lacey’s 
discussion on the legislative conception of free will, where she argues that bodily and 
emotional aspects of sexual crimes are placed in the background and the intellectual 
aspects in the foreground as an effect of this separation of body and mind.125 
5. Concluding comments
In this article we have set Swedish rape legislation in a historical context and presented 
some of the main arguments put forward by feminist legal scholars. As we have seen, 
some of these points of critique have been responded to through the various reforms. 
In recent times the most important change has been the shift in which responsibility 
for the rape is moved from the victim to the perpetrator. This is a great step forward 
as it sends a strong normative message that a woman’s body is unavailable until she 
says ‘yes’. 
The main points of critique that are still relevant can be summarised as an inability in 
law itself to deal with vulnerabilities, structural power imbalances and various forms 
of situations where the victim cannot use her capability to express her will due to 
a demarcated autonomy in the specific time- and spatial-bound context. Although 
some of these problems were addressed in the preparatory works, it is obvious that 
they still remain unsolved. Although the interests to protect, the right to personal and 
sexual integrity and sexual self-determination, are founded in lived reality, there is 
still a gap in relation to the legal construction. The legal construction takes its point 
of departure in the prerequisite of voluntariness and builds on the idea of two equal 
parties in accordance with the liberal idea of autonomy, although there are certain 
exceptions. The gap between the legal construction and lived reality can partly be 
explained by the male rationale that has influenced the legal construction and the 
everyday life that the construction builds upon. 
When prohibition of purchase of sexual services was introduced, it was exceptional, 
because Sweden was the first country to only criminalise the buyer’s action. Today, 
we have come a long way, by introducing voluntary-based rape legislation. We argue 
that this new legislation of rape means that the offence of purchase of sexual services 
must be seen in a completely new light. One effect of not having recognised the 
entanglement between these two offences is that men can buy their way out of criminal 
responsibility for ‘rape’. Therefore, one important research question to scrutinise in 
more depth in the immediate future is this entanglement as well as the assumptions 
made on the differences between the two offences. 
This review of the previous, as well as the new, rape legislation strengthens our view 
that there is a need for more depth studies of the rape legislation and the application 
125  Lacey 1989 p. 104.
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of it. We hold that the requisite of voluntariness on the one hand is a great step for-
ward for feminist legal work, as described in the second section. On the other hand, 
the requisite raises great challenges when it comes to 1) the fact that men’s knowl-
edge and experiences permeates the preparatory work, 2) this in turn, constitutes a 
problem in the application of the rape legislation because the preparatory works is 
the most important legal source, and 3) one effect in practice, of the male rationale 
within the legislation, is that women as a group, at least not all women, get access to 
the protection that the new rape legislation is supposed to offer them. 
The question of voluntariness is closely linked to the subject and her autonomy. 
Therefore we argue that different understandings of autonomy are important ana-
lytical tools in further research on rape legislation. We suggest an introduction and 
development of the understanding of autonomy as a lived autonomy, based on an 
everyday life perspective, due to its potential as an analytical concept in analyses of 
legislation processes, as well as of application of the law. In a feminist context, and in 
general, the concept is useful if and when one wishes to search for patterns, in this 
case assess whether the new regulation in fact protects his or her personal and sexual 
integrity and sexual self-determination. Not all flowers can grow and evolve in the 
same way irrespective of soil and climatic conditions.126
126 We symbolise lived autonomy as a flower, to underline the lived aspect (from the everyday life 
perspective), where each petal illustrates how autonomy is constantly in change, and thus showing 
that the individual’s autonomy is elastic. The expansion of the autonomy or demarcation of the 
same is illustrated by the length of the petals. A person’s autonomy can be reduced or expanded 
over time due to the relational and situational context and depends on an infinite variation 
of factors, coercive circumstances and vulnerability included. A person’s autonomy also varies 
through life: a youth has a delimited autonomy compared to an adult. 
